关键词: 政府补贴政策, 碳税政策, 权力结构, 减排

Abstract: In the context of unequal Low-Carbon Supply Chain (LCSC) power structures and Low-Carbon Policies (LCPs),to promote firms to actively reduce emissions and help the government formulate appropriate LCPs,it is necessary to explore the internal relation between LCSC power structures and different LCPs.Based on subsidy and carbon tax policy,the Stackelberg game models with manufacturer leading and retailer leading were constructed respectively to study LCSC carbon emission reduction and pricing decisions in different situations.The main research results were as follows:① under the subsidy policy,if Consumer Environmental Awareness (CEA) was relatively small,the power structure of retailers could enhance the positive effects of subsidies on Carbon Emissions Reduction (CER) and firms'profit;if CEA was relatively large,the power structure of retailers was only detrimental to manufacturers.② under the carbon tax policy,which power structure could reduce (enhance) the negative (positive) impact of the carbon tax on CER and retailers'profit depended on the Initial Carbon Emissions (ICE);for manufacturers,the power structure of retailers could not only alleviate the negative impact of carbon tax on their profit,but also enable carbon tax to increase their profit;under the two power structures,the maximum CER efficiency of the subsidy policy was the same,while the maximum CER efficiency of the carbon tax policy was higher under the retailer power structure.③ under the manufacturer's power structure,the subsidy policy had more advantages over the carbon tax policy for environment,consumers and LCSC under certain conditions;under the leadership of retailers,two different LCPs might be better,depending on the ICE and subsidy intensity.

Key words: government subsidy policy, carbon tax policy, power structure, carbon emission reduction