Abstract: To research the pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of the supply chain with risk aversion members under fuzzy demand,the fuzzy product demand was adopted to describe the uncertain demand of market.A two-stage supply chain decision model was constructed in the cases of risk averse,and the explicit solutions to the optimal decision were derived.A revenue sharing contract based on Shapley value was designed to coordinate the supply chain.The results showed that when the fuzzy uncertainty of market demand changed and in a higher risk aversion  for manufacturer and the retailer,the optimal price would be decreased as the increasing of decreased market demand possibility,but would be unchanged as the increasing of increased market demand possibility.The opportunities to raise prices to obtain high returns would be lost under the condition of increased market demand possibility.The risk-averse decision maker would choose the risk-averse opponent as partners.The revenue sharing contract based on Shapley value could coordinate the supply chain system perfectly.

Key words: credibility theory, fuzzy demand, risk-aversion, conditional value at risk, supply chains, pricing strategy, coordination mechanism

摘要： 为了研究模糊需求下成员具有风险规避行为供应链的定价策略和协调机制,基于市场需求不确定的现实,将需求模糊化处理,构建了具有风险规避制造商和零售商的供应链决策模型,得到最优决策的显示解,设计了基于Shapley值的收益共享契约协调机制。研究结果表明,当市场需求的模糊程度发生变化以及制造商和零售商对风险规避的程度较大时,最优价格决策随市场需求减少可能性的增加而降低,随市场需求增加可能性的增加而保持不变;风险规避程度较大的制造商和零售商在规避风险的同时会丧失在市场需求可能增加情形下提高价格从而获得高收益的机会;风险规避的决策者会选择风险规避的对手作为合作伙伴;基于Shapley值的收益共享契约能够让模糊需求下的供应链达到完美协调。

关键词: 可信性理论, 模糊需求, 风险规避, 条件风险价值, 供应链, 定价策略, 协调机制